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RECENT DECISIONS
thousand dollars, which is not more favorable than the lower court's
judgment and therefore is not subject to subsection (1)'s notice re-
quirement.
The court is correct in holding that under 274.12(2) there need
be no notice of review of any error if the correction of which would
merely support the judgment or order appealed from.3 7 But, prior to
the court's finding that the trial court should have as a matter of law
refused to allow any award for future pain and suffering, rather re-
ducing that part of the award from two thousand to one thousand
dollars, the request of the plaintiff for reinstatement of the original
jury award, six thousand dollars, was in actuality a request for a
correction which would be greater than the judgment granted by the
trial court, four thousand dollars. The supreme court seemed to be
acting with hindsight in its determination that subsection (2) applied.
In actuality, the plaintiff had sought a correction which if made,
would have been more favorable to him and would not have merely
"support the judgment.' '3 Thus, the court's application of section
274.12(2) under the facts seems to be questionable.
DAVID W. LEIFKER
Damages: The Declining Significance of the Ad Darnnum Clause
-The plaintiff in Zelof v. Capital City Transfer, Inc.1 brought an ac-
tion against the defendant moving company for damages resulting
from its alleged negligence in packing and moving some of her house-
hold effects. The ad damnum clause in the complaint was in the sum
of $1070.33. After finding the defendant liable the jury assessed plain-
tiff's damages at $3000.00. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to
amend the ad damnurn clause to $3000 in order to conform the plead-
ing to the verdict, but subsequently held that the applicable law re-
quired that the amendment be allowed only if the defendant were
granted a new trial on the issue of damages.
On appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that:
"... under sec. 270.57, Stats. and sec. 269.44, Stats. the court has
the power after verdict and before judgment in furtherance of
justice and upon such terms as may be just to allow an amend-
ment to increase the amount of the ad damnum clause to the
amount of the verdict so the pleadings and verdict will support a
judgment of the amount awarded.
WAhat are just terms necessarily depends upon the facts of the
case. When a defendant is in fact misled by the amount of the
ad damnum clause, the court may well impose different terms
than when the defendant cannot prove he has been misled. No
mathematical rule of disparity between the amount of the ver-
dict and the ad damnum clause can be formulated.
37 WIS. STAT. §274.12 (2) (1963).129 Wis. 2d 384, 139 N.W. 2d 1 (1966).
196
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
* . . [U]nder our pleading statutes we think the correct rule is
stated in Clute v. Clintonville Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1911), 144
Wis. 638 at p. 644, 129 N.W. 661, at p. 664, 32 L.R.A., N.S.,
240, when it said: 'In the absence of any showing that the de-
fendants were misled or placed at any disadvantage by reason
of the averments of the complaint in reference to the amount
of damage sustained it was within the sound discretion of the
trial court to permit the amendment.'"2
The ad damnum clause itself has been the subject of much criticism.
This criticism has resulted from the abuses of the clause, mainly in
the practice of pleading an inflated and excessive amount of damages.A
A few states, namely Pennsylvania,4 New Jersey,5 and Florida,6 have
done away with the requirement of a specific statement of the damages
sought. All that is allowed is a statement that the amount being asked
is within the jurisdictional requirements of the court.
Wisconsin has not gone this far. Section 263.03(3) of the Wis-
consin statutes requires that the complaint shall contain "a demand
of the judgment to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled; if the
recovery of money be demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated."
However, the ad damnum clause itself has limited significance in Wis-
consin. The amount thereof may not be mentioned to the jury by
counsel at any time,7 and in addition, the court may not instruct upon
it." Its main significance at present is with relation to the exact ques-
tion involved in Zelof. That is, what, if any, limit does the clause place
on the amount allowable in the final judgment.
The problem, which was originally discussed in Pierce v. Northey,9
arose again in McCartie v. Muth,10 where the plaintiff sought to amend
2Id. at 390-92, 139 N.W. 2d at 4-5.3 The Ad Damnum Clause, The Problem and Solution, monograph, The De-
fense Research Institute, Inc.
4 "Any pleading demanding relief for unliquidated damages shall without claim-
ing any specific sum, set forth only whether the amount is in excess of, or
not in excess of $10,000.00." Rule 1044 (b), PENNSYLVANiA RULES OF CrVIL
PROCEDURES (Supp. 1965).
5 "Where unliquidated money damages are claimed in any court, other than
the County District Court, the pleading shall demand damages generally with-
out specifying the amount. Rule 4:8-1, NEw JERSEY SUPREME COURT
RuLEs (1960).
6 "Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim must state a
cause of action and shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already
has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support
it, (2) a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several dif-
ferent types may be demanded. Every complaint shall be considered to pray
for general relief." Rule 1.8 (b), FLORIDA RULES OF CrVIL PROCEDURE (1966).7 Affett v. Milwaukee & S. T. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W. 2d 274, 86 A.L.R.
2d 227 (1960).8 Otto v. Milwaukee Northern Ry. Co., 148 Wis. 54, N.W. 157 (1912).
9 14 Wis. 10 (1861).
10 230 Wis. 604, 284 N.W. 529 (1939).
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a $4000 ad damnum clause to $5000 after a jury verdict for that
amount. There the court said:
But we consider that in a case where the damages are un-
liquidated, as here, the granting of the amendment should be
denied except on condition of a new trial, at least on the ques-
tion of damages.:"
This statement is clear enough, but the holding of the case is made
somewhat ambiguous by the fact that the court also determined that
$4000 was the most that any jury might properly award:
Where, as here, the ad damnum clause is as high as a jury
might properly award, the new trial should be made optional
with the defendant. 2
This ambiguity might account for the fact that in the subsequent
case of Pietsck v. Groholski1 3 the McCartie case is not even mentioned.
The verdict was for $26,170.50 on the defendant's counterclaim, which
had demanded $25,000. The court stated:
The fact that the jury awards damages somewhat in excess of
the amount prayed for is not error in itself. If the amount is
not excessive, if it has a true relation to the injuries sustained,
the jury verdict will stand.1 4
It does not appear that a motion was made to amend the ad damnum
clause.
In Schwartz v. Schneuriger,5 where the recovery sought was
$25,000 and the verdict was for $27,000, the court was confronted with
the apparent conflict between the McCartie and Pietsch cases. The
court disposed of this by attempting to distinguish McCartie on the
basis that in that case the ad dxamnum clause was for the largest amount
that a jury could reasonably have awarded. 16 It was then stated"7 that
the verdict for $27,000 could stand under section 270.571s of the Wis-
consin statutes. Again, it does not appear that a motion was made to
amend the ad damnum clause.
These cases provide the background for Zelof. If there was any
question remaining as to the effect of McCartie, and its predecessor
Pierce, it was settled by the court's statement in Zelof that "neither
the Pierce nor the McCartie cases should represent under modem prac-
11 Id at 609, 284 N.W. at 531.
12 Id. at 609-610, 284 N.W. at 531.
3255 Wis. 302, 38 N.W. 2d 500 (1949).
14 Id. at 310, 38 N.W. 2d at 504.15 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W. 2d 756 (1955).
is Id. at 547, 69 N.W. 2d at 762.
17 Ibid.
Is "Measure of relief. The relief granted to the plainitff, if there be no answer,
cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in
any other case the court may grant him any relief consistent with the case
made by the complaint and embraced within the issue." Wis. STAT. §270.57
(1963).
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tice a hard or fast or an inexorable rule. To that extent, language to
the contrary is overruled." 19
The first question to be answered is what is the extent of the hold-
ing in Zelof. The only rule that can be extracted from the case with
certainty is to the effect that where the ad damnum clause is approxi-
mately in the amount of $1000, the defendant is not misled or preju-
diced as a matter of law by the court's allowing the plaintiff to amend
the clause to the amount of $3000. The court clearly stated that the
holding is limited to situations where the defendant has not shown
that he was prejudiced.20 Thus, since the defendant is apparently al-
ways required to make this showing, under facts similar to those in
Zelof the defendant can never be said to have been prejudiced as a
matter of law since this would eliminate the requirement that he must
prove that he was misled.
The very nature of the problem involved would seem to preclude
any extension of the rule of Zelof beyond the exact amount of the
original ad damnum clause and the exact amount of the verdict there
involved. This is so because when, as here, there are two sums in-
volved, the relationship between them may be expressed as either the
mathematical difference or the ratio between the two. Here the differ-
ence between them was approximately $2000 and the ratio is 3 to 1.
Since the two relationships are independent of each other, in the ab-
sence of an explicit statement by the court as to which relationship is
pertinent, any choice between them would be unreliable, and if a for-
mula were to be used, a choice would necessarily have to be made.
Thus, the ruling in Zelof is almost completely limited to its facts.21
The court, in Zelof, did discuss the question of whether the plead-
ings must be amended, referring to Pietsch v. Groholskj2 2 and Schwartz
v. Schneuriger 23
We do not contend either of these cases stands for the proposi-
tion a verdict in excess of an ad damnum clause can stand and
support a judgment without an amendment to the pleadings but
they indicate a verdict in excess of the ad damnum clause is
not necessarily lost for that reason.
24
Obviously, this does not answer the question at all. However, the ques-
tion is not of much importance in itself. If the ad damnum clause may
be amended as a matter of course, then it is the same in effect as
19 29 Wis. 2d at 387, 139 N.W. 2d at 3.
20 "In the absence of any showing that the defendants were misled or placed
at any disadvantage by reason of the averments of the complaint in reference
to the amount of damage sustained it was within the sound discretion of the
trial court to permit the amendment." 29 Wis .2d at 392. 139 N.W. 2d at 5.
21 "What are just terms necessarily depends upon the facts of the case." 29 Wis.
2d at 391, 139 N.W. 2d at 4.
22 255 Wis. 302, 38 N.W. 2d 500 (1949).
23269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W. 2d 756 (1955).
24 29 Wis. 2d at 390, 139 N.W. 2d at 4.
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allowing a verdict to stand which is in excess of an unamended ad
damnum clause. Thus the concept of consistency of pleadings and proof
is actually irrelevant to the ultimate question of whether or not the
defendant is prejudiced where the plaintiff is allowed to recover an
amount in excess of the original ad damnum clause, whether amended
or unamended. It makes no practical difference to the defendant whether
or not the clause is amended after trial if he must pay the larger
verdict in either case.
Zelof, therefore, does not add much to the previous Wisconsin law
with respect to the function of the ad damnum clause. It merely pro-
vides a more dramatic example of the ratio between the clause and the
verdict than was present in previous cases. It should be pointed out
that the $2000 difference between clause and verdict was almost the
same as that in Schwartz v. Schneuriger,2 5 where, however, the verdict-
ad damnum ratio was only twenty-seven to twenty-five. There was
certainly a substantial amount of precedent 6 for allowing recovery in
excess of the amount demanded in the original ad damnum clause.
Due to the substantial disparity in ratio between the original de-
mand and the amount of the verdict, it can be argued that Zelof indi-
cates a trend toward diminishing the already small significance of the
ad damnum clause in Wisconsin. However, the clause does have some
significance since its existence is the starting point for the requirement
that the defendant not be "misled or placed at any disadvantage by
reason of the averments of the complaint in reference to the amount
of damage sustained .... ,,27 In addition, the clause limits recovery in
default actions where, by virtue of section 270.5728 of the Wisconsin
statutes, the recovery may not exceed the amount demanded in the
complaint.
The further development, if any, of ad damnum law in Wisconsin
might take one of two directions. The requirement of the statement
of the damages in the present ad damnum form could be retained, with
increasing judicial liberality in allowing amendment after verdict, or
the clause could be done away with as was done in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Florida, by legislative enactment, retaining only the re-
quirement that the recovery sought be stated to be within the juris-
dictional limits of the court.
If the direction to be taken is that of increasing liberality of amend-
ment, the problem of the misled defendant still remains. It is arguable
that there is a partial default in actions where, because of a low ad
damnum amount, the defendant elects not to seriously contest the issue
25 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W. 2d 756 (1955).
26 Pietsch v. Groholski, 255 Wis. 302, 38 N.W. 2d 500 (1949); Schwartz V.
Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W. 2d 756 (1955).
27 29 Wis. 2d at 392, 139 N.W. 2d at 5.
28 Note 18 supra.
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of damages. Thus, it could be said that section 270.57,29 with respect
to limiting recovery to the amount of the ad damnum clause in default
judgments, should also apply where there is in effect a partial default.
However, it can also be said that the defendant would not be justified
in relying on the ad damnum clause if he knew that it could be easily
amended. This boils down to the old question whether the defendant
should be deemed to have been misled as a matter of law when there
is a disparity between the original demand and the recovery, and, for
the present at least, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has said that this
depends upon the facts in each individual case.3"
If, however;, the legislature should adopt a procedure whereby the
statement of the recovery being sought should be framed only in terms
of the jurisdictional limits of the court where suit is brought, the
problem of the misled defendant is eliminated, since a defendant could
not be said to rely on something that does not exist. However, there
is a policy question which would be involved in taking this step. That
is, does the defendant need a statement of the damages sought in order
to determine his approximate area of exposure?
The extreme situation, in which the defendant would know for sure
the limits of his exposure, would exist in a jurisdiction where the re-
covery may never exceed the amount of the original ad damnum clause.
However, the natural result of this absolute limitation would be in-
flated ad damnum clauses which would be made large enough to cover
any possible jury verdict within limits which would not require re-
mittitur. Thus the defendant has as a guide a figure which is so large
that he would not be justified in trying the lawsuit as though this figure
represented his approximate area of exposure when, in fact, the proba-
bility of a corresponding amount in the verdict is infinitesimal.
The effect is also the same in Wisconsin if the verdict must cor-
respond approximately to the ad damnum clause. The plaintiff has
nothing to lose by pleading an astronomical figure. It thus appears that
the ad damnumr clause can never provide a meaningful guide to the
defendant's possible exposure. The only time that the plaintiff would
ever be justified in asking for the exact amount he believes the case
to be worth would be where he knows that he will not be held to it if
the evidence subsequently shows that he is entitled to more. If he
must show that the defendant was not prejudiced by the original state-
ment of damages, he will in all probability develop the practice of
pleading excessive damages as a safety factor.
If the ad damnum clause is found to serve no useful purpose, and
is eliminated from the pleadings, it should be noted that the defendant
still would have no protection from a request for an exorbitant re-
29 Ibid.
30 Zelof v. Capital City Transfer Inc. Note 21 supra.
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covery made on closing argument by the plaintiff. In fact, the de-
fendant will have lost the right to claim surprise since there is no
ad damnum clause on which he could have relied. However, the right
to claim surprise under our present law could be largely illusory if the
courts adopt the idea that the defendant has no justification for relying
on the ad damnum clause.
As was previously stated, the Zelof case does not represent a radical
change in the law with respect to the significance of the ad damnum
clause. The only aspect that sets it apart from previous cases is its
more dramatic percentage disparity between the amounts of the verdict
and the recovery sought. This could indicate a trend toward the ulti-
mate holding that the clause may be amended as a matter of course,
with the corollary thereof that the defendant is not prejudiced by
allowing the amendment because he has no justification for relying
on the amount stated in the original complaint.
The more interesting and less apparent significance of the Zelof
case is that it points up the difficulties that both courts and lawyers
have with the ad damnum clause. A close reading of some of the lan-
guage in the case indicates that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would
welcome its abolition. Since the clause has little, if any, real meaning
in Wisconsin, its elimination would clear up much of the present mis-
understanding and confusion.
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